Barring some catastrophic policy blunder by the United States, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, will eventually be defeated.
The US-led international coalition that has assembled to fight the most formidable terrorist organisation of modern times overmatches ISIS on every relevant dimension -manpower, lethality, financial resources, global reach. As such, the defeat of ISIS, at least in its current form, is This question is important, moreover, because even though ISIS's defeat is inevitable, that defeat will come at an extremely high price. Among other things, ISIS's rise has directly threatened the survival of Syria, Iraq and Libya, and at its height posed an ominous threat to Jordan and even Saudi Arabia.
2 It has generated waves of foreign fighters that, upon their return home, have posed ongoing domestic security threats in a way that members of previous terrorist groups did not. 3 It has inspired lone-wolf and copycat attacks that have inflicted significant costs in lives and proven devilishly difficult to forestall. 4 It has served as an incubator for innovative techniques of recruitment, mobilisation and organisation that future terrorist groups may exploit. 5 It has exacerbated what the UN human-rights chief has called 'the worst man-made disaster since World War II', the Syrian civil war, generating additional waves of refugees and thereby threatening the political unity and stability of Europe. 6 It has resulted in enormous destruction, including of priceless cultural landmarks in the Middle East. 7 It has imposed the serious cost of strategic distraction on the United States, dragging the Obama administration into yet another war in the Middle East. 8 It has resulted in the loss of tens of thousands (if not more) of innocent lives in Iraq, Syria and far beyond. 9 And given the extent to which the threat posed by ISIS figured in America's 2016 presidential campaign, the group's rise may have helped decide that election. 10 Determining whether these severe costs -for the Middle East, neighbouring regions such as Europe, and even the United States -could have been avoided promises to be painful, but necessary.
Answers to the question of whether different choices by US policymakers could have averted some of these downsides, or allowed the problem of ISIS to be managed at a lower cost, have so far been both impressionistic and polarised. 11 One thing that all these assessments have in common, however, is that they tend to be based more on assertion than on evidence or analysis, and they are often coloured with a partisan or ideological hue.
Here, we seek to provide a more systematic and balanced assessment 
12
By mid-2014, in other words, ISIS had become the strongest, bestresourced and most ideologically potent terrorist quasi-state of the post-9/11 era. Many of the costs associated with its rise were unavoidable from that point on; any struggle to defeat ISIS was bound to be long and difficult.
Perhaps Washington and its coalition partners could have marginally accelerated that struggle by taking a less incremental approach to counter-ISIS military operations from June 2014 onward, but by then ISIS's rise was a fact to be dealt with rather than an eventuality to be averted. 13 Our counterfactual analysis therefore addresses decisions taken prior to the fall of Mosul, the point at which ISIS reached the pinnacle of its power.
Counterfactual analysis has a bad name among many academic historians, who associate it with parlour games and the 'alternative histories' favoured by popularisers. 14 Yet political scientists, and some historians, have long understood that counterfactual analysis is integral to causal claims. As James Fearon has argued, every causal claim is simultaneously a counterfactual claim: proving that X caused Y is also proving that not-X would produce not-Y. 15 Policymakers also continually engage in counterfactual reasoning, whether they realise it or not. If a policymaker claims that some initiative will produce the best possible outcome, they are, implicitly or explicitly, making the counterfactual claim that the alternative choices will fare worse. AQI had been brought to the verge of military defeat by the US surge and the concurrent Anbar Awakening, which inflicted devastating blows on an organisation that had seemed ascendant in the years immediately following the US invasion. 31 Overall violence declined sharply, sectarian tensions receded (though hardly disappeared), and a more democratic and inclusive political process slowly began to take hold. After 2010-11, however, the pendulum swung back in a more ominous direction. The dominant trends were increasing political polarisation, hyper-sectarian governance, increasing violence and terrorism, and a dramatic erosion of the capabilities and professionalism of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). 32 All of these trends, in turn, created the context in which ISIS exploded onto the scene.
Critics have subsequently alleged that different US policy decisions, such
as prodding Maliki to step aside or to accept a power-sharing arrangement with Allawi in 2010, or leaving a residual US force of perhaps 10,000-20,000
troops after 2011, would have averted or mitigated these problems, and prevented ISIS's emergence. 33 The administration and its defenders, on the other hand, have argued that better choices were not available -because there was no plausible political alternative to Maliki, because the United At this point, moreover, the United States still possessed significant leverage in Iraqi politics. It had influence with nearly all the major Iraqi political factions, because the roughly 50,000 US troops still in the country represented the primary guarantee of its security, and the primary hedge against a resurgence of the out-of-control sectarian violence that had nearly torn Iraq apart in earlier years. 40 The United States also had significant leverage vis-à- 
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For all these reasons, the desirability of this counterfactual is perhaps less obvious than some critics of the Obama administration's policy have argued. 48 Nevertheless, given how much the United States had invested up to this point in creating a pluralistic, non-sectarian Iraq; given that the liabilities of essentially allowing Maliki a free hand were widely understood both within and outside the administration; and given that the United
States still possessed significant political influence in 2010, one might still argue that a more involved approach to Iraqi politics, one that insisted on different leadership or simply stricter conditionality in US dealings with
Maliki at a time when he was politically exposed, could have mitigated the political conditions that would ultimately give rise to ISIS. 49 rather than hanging back from the process as it ground to a halt. The Obama team also could have made a stay-behind force more attractive to the Iraqis.
As it was, the team was very slow to settle on a realistic post-2011 force posture to propose as its opening bid in the negotiations, deferring the start of the effort until well after the US midterm elections in November 2010, and continuing to debate well into 2011 whether a stay-behind force was even desirable. 53 With respect to the size of the force, the Pentagon initially proposed numbers in the range of 20,000 troops, and the White House was initially willing to seek a force of some 10,000 troops -a contingent sizeable enough to contribute significantly to Iraqi security. The White House soon began to retreat from that position, however, and subsequently insisted on extremely low numbers -ultimately, around 3,500 troops -that undermined the security benefit to the Iraqi government without materially lowering the political cost of permitting them to stay. The reason Obama did not intervene during this period was not, ironically, because he believed that it was too late to alter the course of events in Iraq, but because he had misplaced confidence that such intervention was unnecessary.
As captured in his infamous remark dismissing ISIS as a 'jayvee team', the president still viewed ISIS as a local problem for Iraq and Syria, and not the fullfledged regional and even international security challenge it would soon become. 97 The Obama administration, whose insight into events in Iraq was limited by the extremely light US footprint there, also believed that the ISF, which on paper was still a robust, sizeable, force, could blunt ISIS's advance.
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Moreover, although the Maliki government was requesting greater US assistance on ever more urgent terms, Obama judged -correctly, in our view -that Maliki was as much a part of the problem as part of the solution. 99 Maliki's hyper-sectarian policies were providing the ideological fuel The emergence of ISIS as a fully formed, major danger to regional and international security was not inevitable. To be sure, the group's ascendancy can be traced in part to deep historical forces that took generations to develop and would have been hard to shift on the timeline contemplated in this assessment. And it would be a mistake to underplay the powerful local and regional dynamics, from sectarianism to state failure, that created such a conducive context for its emergence. But the rise of ISIS -or more precisely, the failure to thwart the rise of ISIS -also can be traced to policy decisions made by US administrations that enjoyed more freedom of choice, and more ability to affect the trajectory of that organisation, than they are generally inclined to acknowledge.
In retrospect, the most fateful choice was also the oldest one: the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, followed by the mismanagement of the occupation.
That choice either unleashed or exacerbated many of the forces that drove ISIS's ascendancy. A different course of events would have left Iraq as a major problem (though one that was perceived to be larger than it actually was), but not the type of problem that was likely to lead to the rise of an ISISlike threat within a decade.
It is therefore correct to assert that the policies of 2003 loom large in any assessment of ISIS's rise. But it is not correct to claim that the invasion of Iraq set in motion forces that led ineluctably to the problems that the United States has faced since mid-2014. On the contrary, we identified three other pivot points in the story where a different but plausible policy choice might have reduced the ISIS threat by a greater or lesser extent, albeit at some cost.
One of these decisions was Obama's strategy for dealing with Iraq in 2010-11, which involved, firstly, a reluctance to apply US leverage to shape the formation of the Iraqi government after the 2010 election, and, secondly, the failure to secure a significant stay-behind force in Iraq. Had the Obama administration taken a different approach in these episodes, it is reasonable to believe that the situation in Iraq might not subsequently have deteriorated so dramatically, and that Washington would, at a minimum, have had better options for blocking or mitigating ISIS's rise at lower risk before that organisation reached its terrifying peak in late 2014. Even in 2010-11, earlier decisions had fateful repercussions for later decisions. For instance, the failure to achieve a power-sharing agreement or otherwise impose con- prevent the rise of other ISIS-like movements in the future. If, however, the counterfactual analysis that we offer here is correct in asserting that ISIS's rise was not inevitable, then it follows that there may be policy steps the United States can take to ensure that the defeat of one powerful terrorist quasi-state is not simply followed by the rise of another -steps that are likely to involve trade-offs and costs of their own. Unfortunately, the history related here does not yield an exact formula for determining those policies and assessing their costs and trade-offs. History is, at best, a general rather than a precise guide to statecraft. Moreover, assessing the best course of action for US policymakers in the next phase of the ongoing struggle against terrorists inspired by militant Islamism should hinge on many factors beyond the scope of this article. But the policy debates that precede any such decisions must begin with the insight we offer here: that good policy hinges on strategic judgements that are themselves counterfactual assessments, and that a nuanced and intellectually honest approach to making such assessments is therefore vital.
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